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ABstrACt
In response to a critique of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and what it might offer ‘an-
thropology’, this article sets out to formulate a relation between the two that 
encompasses an ambitious programme of both knowledge and justice. A cos-
mopolitan anthropology would look beyond cultural difference to common 
civilisation, beyond local traditions to truth and beyond conventions of per-
sonhood to a universal individuality. To know the human, to find ways justly 
to represent the human and to secure the human in moral social arrangements, 
is necessarily to come to terms with the individuality of life and identity.
prefACe
In her article, ‘Multiple Peripherals One Cosmopolitanism’ (sites 13 (1), 2016), 
Brigitte Lewis offers a ‘feminist analysis of cosmopolitanism’ (p. 1) and reveals 
the weaknesses of the latter as an ‘emancipatory political practice’ (p. 11). She 
focuses criticism on my book, Anyone, the Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropol-
ogy (2012). The book, Lewis feels, is ‘tied up in an androcentric worldview’ that 
does not ‘make space for gender and the complexities of woman’s place’ (p. 7); 
making ‘masculinist versions of us all’ in a false universalisation, it omits the 
subject as ‘a lesbian woman’ (pp. 2–6). I am grateful to Brigitte Lewis for the 
attention she has paid to my work. I am also grateful to the editor of sites for 
this opportunity to reply to Lewis’s critique and to elaborate on my position 
concerning the nature of cosmopolitanism. In what follows, I introduce some 
of the main propositions of Anyone, the Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropology, 
first, and then address Lewis’s specific criticisms.
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A CosmopolitAn AnthropologY
Immanuel Kant was the first modern thinker to use the term ‘anthropology’. 
He used it in association with ‘cosmopolitanism’: anthropology as the science 
of the human was to be a cosmopolitan, an emancipatory, project. An essential 
commonality undergirded human differences – both natural differences and 
the sociocultural distinctions that human beings had invented for themselves. 
Anthropology would come to know a universal human nature and how it came 
to express itself in difference. This knowledge might emancipate human be-
ings – globally – from the ignorances and the inequalities and violences of an 
ancien regime that followed merely traditional paths in an unreasoning fashion. 
It was ignorant to see people as essentially in possession of different natures 
on account of their wealth or social status, their religious belief or unbelief, 
their age, their race, their gender, their nationality; and it was inegalitarian 
to ground social structures in these differences; and it led to violence when 
people based their identities on these social categories and divided the world 
into insiders and outsiders. Anthropology was that empirical discipline that 
brought humanity to a mature recognition of its universal capacities – of what 
human beings could and, by rights, should make of themselves as freely acting 
beings – giving onto a ‘cosmopolitan law’ that recognised all human beings as 
citizens of a universal state of humankind (Kant 1798).
Anyone, the Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropology is written in a hopeful, Kan-
tian vein. It looks forward, idealistically, to both a science and a society that is 
not in thrall to identity politics – to culturalism and multiculturalism – and es-
chews strategic essentialism. It regards these as contemporary counterparts of 
that ancien regime that would divide people from one another and from them-
selves on the basis of invented, unnecessary and rhetorical statuses and devices: 
that trap people in classes and categories. A cosmopolitan anthropology is a 
project to emancipate from category-thinking; at the least, to put culture in its 
place and to recognise the fundamental universalities and commonalities that 
exist beyond it: to know these latter and to have the opportunity to live them 
in a civil and civilized way (Rapport 2012a). Beneath the surface of cultural 
differences, as Michael Jackson writes, are ‘comparable imperatives, logics, and 
dispositions’ (2004: 153, 206); anthropology ‘annuls the language of cultural 
essence’, recognising cultures, genders, ethnicities, nations, to be merely the 
contingent contexts in which people live their humanity (2002: 118). 
I conceive of anthropology as a three-part process comprising knowledge, aes-
thetics, and ethics. Anthropology would know the nature of human being; an-
thropology would also know how to know: how to discern and how to represent 
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the nature of the human; finally, given what has been learnt and represented, 
anthropology would treat the moral and political consequences in train. A sci-
ence of the human, an aesthetics of the human and an ethics of the human are 
the components of an ambitious, Kantian discipline. Human nature is there 
to be known by us – the essence of who we (all) are – and human nature is 
there to be represented, to be communicated by us, and human nature is there 
to be cherished, nourished, secured by us. Humankind is not the only kind 
of organic life, and the organic and inorganic are indissolvably connected in 
the universe, but knowing ourselves and disseminating this knowledge ap-
propriately (aesthetically) and deploying this knowledge ethically so that that 
nature and the precious organic (fleeting) life to which it gives rise might be 
recognised, respected and best accommodated socially and politically, is where 
our human positioning of ourselves in the universe might begin.
In using the term ‘cosmopolitanism’, rehabilitating it from ancient Greek phi-
losophy, Kant recognised a duality inherent in the human condition. On the 
one side was cosmos, the human whole, the species to which all belonged 
equally and alike. On the other side was polis, the actual human life lived lo-
cally and individually, each one unique. The nature of human being spanned 
this apparently paradoxical arc between the universal and the unique, between 
species wholeness and individual embodiment. Humanity represented itself 
in individuality. Each individual embodiment was a paradigmatic, a ‘perfect’, 
representation of the human – no single body was more human or less human 
than another – and yet this individuality was a manifestation of a nature that 
all shared. The cosmopolitan project of anthropology was to traverse this arc, 
interrogate its tensions and unravel the apparent paradox whereby human 
commonality lived as individual difference.
Anyone is the name I would give to this individual, universal, human actor 
(Rapport 2010a). It is Anyone’s life that I would know, that I would aesthetically 
represent, and that I would ethically secure. It is by juxtaposing Anyone’s life 
against Anyone else’s – by zigzagging from one precious uniqueness to another 
(Rapport 1994: 30–36) – that I would hope to accede to a picture of what the 
unique lives share: how they emerge from a common human nature.
Two key distinctions may usefully be deployed in the analytical process of 
bringing together the human and the individual. The first is between capacity 
and substance. To be human can be said to be in possession of certain universal 
capacities, as birthright; to live a human life is to enact or substantiate, to fulfil, 
these capacities in an individual and unique way (Rapport 2010b). I am alone 
in how I imagine, in how I feel pain, in how I am pleased or displeased: in how 
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I make sense of what my human senses inform me surrounds and infiltrates 
my body. But so is Anyone: it is the fate of every human being to imagine, to 
feel pain, to be pleased or displeased, to make sense – and so on – and to do 
so uniquely, and alone in their bodies. There are common human capacities 
– capabilities and liabilities – and there is unique substance to each and every 
manifestation of those capacities in an actual life. It is the anthropologist’s work 
to traverse this arc. From the individual life met in the field (or the archive), 
juxtaposed against other individual lives, what might I deduce concerning the 
universal capabilities and liabilities that infuse them? From the individual I 
learn of the human; and again, from earlier positings of human nature I may 
anticipate the range within which a particular individual life might be lived. I 
move analytically across the arc from the individual to the human and from 
the human to the individual. (Human capacity includes liabilities as well as 
capabilities: I mean that to be human is to be prone to certain diseases and 
disabilities and limitations as well as potentialities and abilities; it is as human 
to suffer from cancer or cirrhosis of the liver – from a life that ends in death – 
as it is to be able to formulate the Theory of Relativity, to write The Waves, or 
to campaign for universal suffrage.)
A second key distinction in analytically bringing together the human and the 
individual is between ontology and symbology. The ontological is a recogni-
tion of certain natural facts of our condition and of the universe: ontology 
describes the nature of being. The human species and the individual human 
being are ontological facts. Here is a truth that exists whether we recognise 
it – or value it or wish it – or not. There is an animal species that we designate 
as homo sapiens, and that species manifests itself in individual human bodies, 
reproduces itself by way of individual human bodies. Whether we designate 
that species as ‘homo sapiens’ or as ‘squiggly wiggly’, whether we designate that 
species as anything at all or fail to come to a knowledge of that species’ exist-
ence, it will exist and it will have a determining effect on the lives we lead. 
Due to the ontology of our humanity we cannot fly, we die after a certain 
number of years; we are also able to consciously reflect on our capabilities and 
liabilities and endeavour to interfere with them. Part of our ontology as human 
beings is our facility with symbols: we construct languages and cultures and 
societies based on symbolic vehicles – words, musical notes, bodily gestures, 
material artefacts – that signal certain kinds of sense. We symbolically signal 
identity, belonging, value, hierarchy, worth, health, mood. In Clifford Geertz’s 
well-known image, human beings weave webs of significance out of systems 
of symbols that enable them to live largely suspended in cultural spaces and 
social structures. Nevertheless, these symbolic worlds are constructions. They 
are fictions, things that human beings, individually and collaboratively, have 
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made – and made up; they are not truths in the way that ontological facts are 
truths. Indeed, cultural webs of significance must attach themselves to natural 
reality; as Ernest Gellner phrased it (1995: 8), it is the natural construction of 
society that guarantees the cultural construction of reality. The distinction 
between ontology and symbology is a fundamental one for an anthropological 
science of the human. It is a distinction between truths that stand for them-
selves, truths that abide whether or not they are humanly recognised, truths 
that are independent, and truths that depend on human construction and rec-
ognition, and that disappear as soon as their being believed in and invested in 
ceases. The natural modesty of women, the nature of men as sexual predators, 
the domestic as a natural sphere for women, the civic as a natural sphere for 
men – these are fictions, symbolic truths that pertain to a particular culturo-
religious construction. They do not exist if we have no knowledge of them or 
abjure them. But the fact that reproduction of the human species calls for ‘male’ 
and ‘female’ elements to come together in a specific way is an ontological truth 
that we cannot ignore or wish away if we wish for progeny. Equally, human 
individuality, the fact that we occupy distinct bodies with their own metabo-
lisms, their own consciousnesses, their own lifetimes, is an ontological truth; 
it abides whether or not it is culturally recognised or valued, whether or not it 
forms the basis of social-structural incorporation. There is individuality and 
there is all manner of historico-cultural construction of the identity of social 
persons: individualism, dividualism; persona, personage, personne; and so on. 
One does not confuse or conflate the distinction as a cosmopolitan anthro-
pologist – one does not confuse the difference between cultural fictions and 
ontological truths – and one interrogates the distances between them, the fit 
between them. Given the ontological nature of humanity and of individuality, 
is this culturo-symbolic construction appropriate? Is it a good fit? Is this the 
best way – a civilized way – in which our nature as individual human beings, 
as Anyone, might be culturally expressed and socially accommodated? 
In short, there are matters of natural (ontological) fact, and there are matters of 
cultural (symbolical) construction. ‘Civilization’ might be the name one gives 
to a meeting between the symbolical and the ontological such that the former 
does not traduce the latter, through ignorance or vested interest or partiality 
(Rapport 2012b). In particular, the universal expression of human capacity 
that is the embodied individual, that is Anyone, must be emancipated from the 
arbitrary categorisations of sociocultural identification: from what John Stuart 
Mill called ‘the despotism of custom’ (1963: 194); so that the way Anyone con-
ducts and projects its life – its gratifications, its aesthetic choices, its ‘cultural’ 
constructions – is as far as possible an expression of its own will, a fulfilment 
of its own substantiation of its human, capacious birthright.
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CritiQUe of A CosmopolitAn AnthropologY
There are five main criticisms that Brigitte Lewis levels against Anyone, the 
Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropology :
1. Anyone is conceptualized as ‘androgynous at best, excluding by omission’ 
(p. 12); at worst, Anyone is ‘a white heterosexual man’ (p. 14) who ‘contrib-
utes to the management, exploitation and domination of  “others”, especially 
women’ (p. 18). The book does not deal with ‘the various positions occupied 
by a subject in the world’, such as those from which Lewis would see her 
awareness deriving: ‘white, lesbian, middle class (sessional casual academic) 
Australian, gendered female, able-bodied’ (p. 2). 
According to Brigitte Lewis, people in the real world (‘particularly women’) 
are ‘always bound by categories of social difference and hierarchies of power 
that shove them into identities’ (p. 3); amid ‘irremovable daily discrimination’, 
‘women have no place to “become”’ (p. 13). I agree this is iniquitous. The is-
sue is how to overcome such delimiting categorisation. For Lewis, to critique 
gender as a social category is to elaborate on the ‘multi-positional varieties of 
womanhood that exist today’ (p. 4), perhaps as she does herself, above, in her 
self-description, and thus to achieve empowerment through self-identifying in 
categorical terms that are currently stigmatised or minoritarian. The category 
of woman ‘is needed as a form of both potential oppression and a symbol of 
emancipation’ (p. 17): ‘“Look, I exist and I am not alone”’ (p. 4). 
I disagree that to overcome invidious sociocultural categorisation it is neces-
sary to practice strategic essentialism, to embrace the stigmatised category: 
‘woman’, ‘nigger’, ‘Jew’. I disagree, too, that how Brigitte Lewis produces knowl-
edge of the world around her is by way of her being ‘white’, ‘lesbian’, ‘middle 
class’ (‘sessional casual academic’) ‘Australian’, ‘gendered female’, ‘able-bodied’. 
These labels do not come close to describing or containing who she is in herself. 
They might be the convenient (limiting, homogenising) terms of others, terms 
that she might feel she has had to come to terms with in engaging with these 
others, but they do not describe or contain her personal awareness. No com-
monly shared terms ever could. This is the point: to emancipate the individual 
from symbolic collectivisation, homogenisation and essentialisation. The only 
collectives we truly belong to are ontological ones: our human species, and its 
higher zoological classes (genus (homo), family (hominid), order (primate), 
and so on). Moreover, as living exemplars of homo sapiens we are individually 
unique. A civilised society, I have contended, is one that endeavours to come 
to terms with this uniqueness. To isolate an aspect of that identity only, and 
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to give it a public name – ‘woman’, ‘lesbian’, ‘Jew’, ‘communist’, ‘anthropologist’, 
‘footballer’, ‘ale drinker’ – and to fight political battles in those (partial) terms 
– however significant that aspect of a self-identity might seem to be, is to fight 
in the wrong terms. Strategic essentialism cannot overcome essentialisation.
I would recall the prognosis of Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre, liberal mem-
ber of the new French Assembly of 1789, endeavouring to codify Enlighten-
ment principles of human universalism into a new Constitution: ‘To the Jews 
as individuals one must grant everything; to the Jews as a “race” one must 
grant nothing’, he concluded. In emancipating the Jews (and Protestants and 
others) and granting them citizenship, post-Revolutionary France would also 
insist that there are no identities that must legally, politically and morally be 
recognised and guaranteed besides individuality and humanity. Clermont-
Tonnerre’s was a cosmopolitan vision of overcoming the fiction of cultural 
(religious, ethnic, sexual, professional) belonging as collective essence and 
identity. History starts afresh with each new individual life: previously ascribed 
symbolic identities are dangerous warping fictions that must be eschewed 
without strategic compromise. The only true categories are ‘human’ and ‘indi-
vidual’; the unique nature of our individual human being – the fact that each 
individual is a minority of one – is the project of a cosmopolitan anthropol-
ogy and of a civilised society to accommodate. ‘All the same – that is, human; 
each one different – that is, in themselves. Together men form a community 
of exceptions in the world’ (Finkielkraut 2001: 80).
2. ‘Cosmopolitan politesse’ ‘sounds like a rallying cry for respectability politics’, 
for political quietude – ‘playing nice’ – and for not having the ‘bad man-
ners’ to ‘express opinions that challenge dominant hegemonies, oppression, 
patriarchy and male privilege’ (pp. 5–6). Politesse is too ‘utopian’ an idea; we 
do not live in such a democratic world. 
What form might an accommodation of individuality take in a civilised so-
ciety that would avoid the distortions and delimitings born of extraneous 
categorisations, labels and stereotypification? The first is surely, as Stanislas 
de Clermont-Tonnerre proclaimed, a recognition in law of the individual as 
citizen. The individual is the unit of societal belonging: Anyone belongs to 
the society by virtue of his or her individuality, as an equal member. It is the 
individual who is the holder of rights and the focus of social services. And no 
other, symbolic (fictive) entity shares such rights or belonging or attention: 
communities, ethnicities, religions, genders. If individuals nevertheless pursue 
such sub-societal affiliations – as members of communities and so on – then 
this is part of their rights, provided that such affiliations are the voluntary 
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‘achievements’ of those individuals (whose rights to ‘exit’ and choose again 
are similarly safeguarded). It is crucial, however, that such collectives are not 
mistaken for things-in-themselves – with identities greater than the sum of the 
individuals who constitute their existence at any one time.
A second form of accommodation of individuality might be an interactional 
code by which, on a momentary and informal basis, Anyone might be rec-
ognised and included in society. The nature of the code is to presuppose the 
individuality of interacting citizens but not to presume an intimacy with them: 
not to know their private selves or even to assume that private truths can be 
read off from public expressions. This is a balancing act: the code balances 
between a public respect for the individual and a public remoteness from what 
is individual. The public space does not aspire to be one privy to the intima-
cies of personal selfhood, but nor does it massify or stereotype the societal 
members such that they are overwritten by a collective label. ‘Politesse’ is the 
term I would employ to describe a kind of cosmopolitan ‘good manners’. It 
comprises both a polite style of general, public exchange and an ethic of in-
dividual dignity and freedom. Deploying a cosmopolitan politesse one antici-
pates individual difference and respects that difference without compromising 
it according to a blunt, essentialising common denomination: the individual 
as ‘woman’, ‘Jew’, ‘working class’.
Is this utopian? Certainly it is idealistic. But it is also realistic. The other with 
whom one is faced in social interaction is always first and foremost an indi-
vidual other, however they might affiliate themselves (or not) and whatever 
the world-views and life-projects they construe for themselves. One should 
not expect to, and nor should one be expected to, know or even necessarily 
care about these world-views and life-projects so long as they are freely ac-
quired and not ascribed, and so long as they gratify and fulfil the other. The 
collective project that self and other share is the society, its laws and interac-
tional codes, that assure Anyone an equal place: equal space for each to come 
into his or her own. If this is secured then there are no sub-societal collective 
projects – pertaining to class or gender, religion or ethnicity – that demand 
public recognition or special treatment. The interests, the identities, the tastes, 
the beliefs, the values of each individual societal member are unique, and to 
be recognised as such, with each having an equal right to their fulfilment. As a 
parent, a neighbour, a fellow society-member, I do not forget the individuality, 
the radical otherness, the precious singularity of the other with whom I inter-
act. As a fellow professional, football-supporter, religious congregationalist, or 
team-member, I do not overwrite the fundamental separation and difference 
upon which any collective mutuality is based: fellow-members of cultural ‘clubs’ 
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are able to come together and to imagine commonality – aspire to belonging, 
enjoy companionship – because of commonly embodied individual conscious-
nesses that ultimately keep them distinct. Given our individual natures, any 
proposition of collective sameness is a ‘phantasy’ of groupness (Laing 1968, 81). 
3. It is ‘the very definition of sexism’ to write a book that fails to include ‘even 
one feminist or woman-centred cosmopolitanism’ (p. 16).
There is only one cosmopolitanism, in my understanding. It concerns, as I have 
outlined, the knowing, the communicating and the securing of humankind 
and the individual human being. What is to be made, then, of the plethora of 
adjectival cosmopolitanisms – the ‘plural discrepant cosmopolitanisms’ (Clif-
ford 1998) – that are now being proposed? We read of occupational cosmo-
politanism (Hannerz 2007); urban Caribbean cosmopolitans (Wardle 2000); 
rural Togolese cosmopolitans (Piot 1999); upper-class cosmopolitan Cairene 
youth (Peterson 2011); middle-class cosmopolitan Indian families (Lamb 2009), 
working-class Pakistani cosmopolitan migrants (Werbner 1999); cosmopolitan 
dancers and choreographers (Wulff 2009); cosmopolitan patriots (Appiah 
1998), and others. A less than controversial accommodation of these ‘types’ 
is to say that here are accounts of human beings in different societies and 
cultural milieux, occupying different positions in a social structure and dif-
ferent geographical locations, all of whom aspire to or practise a human life 
that overcomes the categorical bounds of a merely contingent, cultural world: 
all seek to escape from the arbitrariness and limitation of local customary 
practices. Does emancipation from different kinds of sociocultural, categorical 
limitation call for different kinds of cosmopolitan awareness? I suspect that 
this is Brigitte Lewis’s perception; precisely, she does not find the concept of 
Anyone sufficiently sympathetic to the specific needs of emancipation from 
patriarchy. Indeed, cosmopolitanism tout court is insufficient for imagining a 
‘human rights based feminism’ (p. 1). 
No doubt there are different local, political and sociocultural battles to be 
fought. But I would say three things. First, an eschewing of category-thinking 
is, I believe, the foundation of all emancipations from culturo-symbolical 
constructions that are in ignorance of the ontological truths of our humanity 
and our individuality. We move towards a human civilization based on cos-
mopolitanism’s threefold promise: true knowledge of human capabilities and 
liabilities; a history of examples of how individual human beings have substan-
tiated their human capacities and invented worlds and lives for themselves; an 
ethical-cum-political project whereby the best current knowledge concerning 
the human and the history of individual human lives translate into social ar-
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rangements that best offer individuals security and the space to come into their 
own: to fulfil their capacities for self-invention and self-gratification. Second, 
these latter social arrangements must accommodate those individuals who 
would share cultural tastes and choices with others: who would form cultural 
‘clubs’ on the basis of religious belief or professional practice or recreational 
enjoyment. Third, these expressions of personal taste are, however, treated as 
epiphenomenal upon the foundational phenomenology of our being human 
and individual. In other words, a civilised society recognises its members as be-
ing first and foremost individual human beings, citizens alike, whatever may be 
their aesthetic choices of culture and community, their voluntary identification 
as ‘Jew’ or ‘anthropologist’ or ‘Melbournian’ or ‘woman’ or ‘lesbian’. An aesthet-
ics of cultural identity is not confused with ontological human and individual 
identities, with essential capacities and rights to be Anyone. 
4. To invoke an Enlightenment heritage is to canonise a Western, rational, ob-
jectifying, male subject, and to omit the whole person: to ‘shrivel our abili-
ties to use our emotions and bodies as sites of knowing’ (p. 6). 
I do not believe this to be the case. I understand ‘the Enlightenment’ as a short-
hand for that moment, and that socio-political and intellectual movement, 
whereby, in Max Weber’s terms, life lived on the basis of merely ‘traditional’ 
knowledge – religious, cultural, customary, ‘commonsensical’ – gave way to 
a ‘scientific’ appropriation of the world. The effects have been revolutionary. 
Ernest Gellner summarized:
‘Cognitive relativism is nonsense, moral relativism is tragic. [How-
ever,] the recognition of the inequality of cognitive claims in no way 
involves unequal treatment of people – quite the reverse. (…) Valid 
knowledge ignores and does not engender frontiers. One simply 
cannot understand our shared social condition unless one starts 
from the indisputable fact that genuine knowledge of nature is pos-
sible and has occurred, and has totally transformed the terms of 
reference in which human societies operate’. (1995: 8)
Weber described this transformation as the triumph of rationality, but to 
my mind that need not be narrowly interpreted as excluding the emotions 
or bodies. The Enlightenment insisted on the right and the propriety of hu-
man beings to know themselves and to arrange themselves according to their 
own, mortal, bodily capacities – without necessary supernatural or custom-
ary warrant. Moreover, as Karl Popper elaborated, no source of knowledge 
was rendered inadmissible in this Enlightenment project: imagination, in-
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tuition, reason, observation, even tradition; scientific discovery was akin to 
‘story-telling, myth-making and the poetic imagination’. Simply put, all forms 
of knowing were  properly subject to evidential processes of testing, critique 
and refutation; none had a priori authority as a guarantee or criterion of truth 
(Popper 1980: 378; 1997: 7).  
5. Anyone is described in the book as ‘he or she’ or ‘s/he’, as ‘him or her’, thus 
forgetting the need to ‘move away from such exclusive and asymmetrical, 
dichotomised distinctions and non-binary personhood as decreed by the 
Transgender movement’ (p. 2).
Brigitte Lewis is right, in that ‘s/he’, ‘his or her’, and so on, may not do justice to 
how an individual chooses to name their gender or their sexuality. There are 
two issues here. Ontologically we know there to be a genetic spectrum between 
what we term ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ traits in an individual human body 
(the middle portion of the spectrum being occupied by ‘hermaphroditic’ or ‘an-
drogynous’ individuals). It is also a truth, however, that sex-dichotomous traits 
(masculine and feminine) must come together for the sake of human repro-
duction. One does not escape a version of ‘he’ and ‘she’ here. Historico-culturally, 
the English language has not to date overcome a dichotomous distinction be-
tween ‘he’ or ‘she’, ‘male’ or ‘female’, to any widespread extent. I wrote Anyone, 
the Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropology in a way I felt to be gender-neutral: 
Anyone was any individual human being. I did not make it sufficiently clear, 
however, that that ontological body – in which normally a majoritarian genetic 
make-up as male or female occurs – gives onto individual lives in which are 
substantiated decisions on gender and sexuality that can exceed the historical 
and traditional resources of a language to accommodate them. Anyone is not 
sufficiently described as ‘he or she’, ‘him or her’.
envoi
I repeat my thanks to Brigitte Lewis for her scholarly engagement. Even where 
we disagree on the means, I believe we share an anthropological end. ‘Recog-
nising human beings as all connected by humanity yet distinctly individual, as 
cosmopolitanism does, is beautiful in theory, [a worthy aspiration, while] to 
achieve it we have a long, long way to go’ (Lewis, p. 16).
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